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aturalist and preservationist John A Muir once
scoffed at the way each of the transcontinental railroads advertised
its line as the "scenic route." In his monumental portrayal of
America's scenic wilderness areas, Our National Parks, he
proposed a new and much more honest advertisement: "Come!
Travel our way. Ours is the blackest. , .. The sky is black and
the ground is black, and on either side there is a continuous
border of black stumps and logs and blasted trees appealing to
heaven for help as if still half alive, and their mute eloquence
is most interestingly touching, . , , No other route on this
continent so fully illustrates the abomination of desolation. III
Observations such as this one regarding the ecological
destructiveness of railroads have tended to obscure the fact
that railroad companies themselves were not necessarily
enemies of the environment. Indeed, in some cases they were
at the forefront of the preservationist and conservationist
movements that were still in their infancy at the time of
Muir's writing in 1901. For example, the Southern Pacific, as
historian Richard Orsi has demonstrated, Iltook a major role

IJohn A. Muir, Our National Parks (Boston, 1901),357-58,
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in the emergence of modern management of water, wilderness
parks, forests, and rangelands. 112
Orsi's conclusions regarding
Southern Pacific contradict the traditional view of that company as a "malevolent
monopoly representing selfish, greedy, corporate interests!!
in opposition to the "people" and the "public interest."3 But
historians have! for the most part! left unchallenged a similar
negative view of Edward H. Harriman, who headed both the
Union Pacific and the Southern Pacific and was perhaps the
most powerful of the railroad tycoons during the first decade
of the twentieth century.4 Prior to Harriman's takeover of the
Southern Pacific in 1901, that railroad's long-standing policy
had been to subdivide and sell lands to farmers, miners, and
loggers, the purpose being lito encourage long-term settlement,
economic growth, and rail traffic," but Harriman questioned
and ultimately rejected this policy.s In January 1903, he ordered
the termination of sales of the remaining Southern Pacific land
grant, including the heavily timbered lands of the Oregon and
California Railroad, which had been a Southern Pacificsubsidiary since 1887.
It remains unclear whether Harriman initially intended for
this suspension to be temporary in order to allow his men to
ascertain fully the nature of his extensive land holdings, or
whether this move in fact represented a permanent shift in
pohcy.6 What is clear is that by 1905 virtually
sales ceased.
Local Oregonians, as well as prominent lumber companies
and politicians in the state, accused Harriman of undermining Oregon's development, and a political movement there
ultimately led the federal government in 1908 to sue Harriman's
Oregon & California Railroad for the forfeiture of its unsold
lands. At the culmination of a seven-year legal battle, the
2Richard ). Orsi, Sunset Limited: The Southern Pacific Railroad and the Development of the American West, 1850-1930 (Berkeley, CA, 2005), xiv-xv.
3!bid., xvii.
4See, e.g., David Maldwyn Ellis, "The Oregon and California Railroad Land
Grant, 1866-1945," Pacific Northwest Quarterly 39:411948): 255-83. Regarding the termination of land sales in January 1903, Ellis asserts that "apparently his aim was to keep for his company any rise in stumpage values." Ellis,
"Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant," 261.

50rs i, Sunset Limited, 37.
60 rsi found evidence that the termination of land sales was, in fact, meant to
be a permanent policy. This is contradicted, however, by the later testimony of
Harriman's land commissioner, Charles W. Eberlein, that the termination-at
least as applied to all of the lands of the Southern Pacific, Central Pacific, and
Oregon & California-was merely to allow Harriman and his centralized land
office to ascertain the nature of the lands, a process delayed by the San Francisco
earthquake and fire a couple of years later. See Orsi, Sunset Limited, 123-25.
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Supreme Court gave Congress the legal authority to seize the
land and to provide for its disposition "in accordance with
such policy as it may deem fitting "-and Congress quickly
passed the Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916, which revested the
remaining 2.3 million acres of the grant to the United States.
Although historians have, for the most part, accepted the view
that Harriman's land policies in Oregon were motivated by his
apparently unrivaled speculative spirit, his policies were in
fact consistent with utilitarian notions of conservation that he
recognized as in keeping with his long-term profit motive.
The railroad issues that arose in the first decade of the
twentieth century were rooted in the land-use regime Congress
had established decades earlier. In the middle of the nineteenth century, federal land grants to railroads were a critical
component of the government's effort to conquer its newly
expanded public domain. Stephen Douglas orchestrated the
first such grant to the Illinois Central in 1850, made possible
by his compromise to grant lands in a checkerboard pattern as
a way to pay for the subsidy. The granting of public lands to
railroads escalated during the Civil War with Congress' passage
of the Pacific Railway Act of 1862, which chartered and granted
lands to the Union Pacific and the Central Pacific to aid in the
construction of a railway from a point on the Missouri River in
Nebraska to a point on the Pacific Ocean at or near San Francisco,
and to the Leavenworth, Pawnee and Western Railroad for the
construction of a southern branch through Kansas. 7 This policy
continued in subsequent years with similar grants to aid in
the construction of transcontinental railways to the north and
south of the Union Pacific-Central Pacific line. In all, the federal government granted roughly 130 million acres to railroads
(37 million of which were granted to railroads via the states)
from 1850 to 1871.
Railroad land grants shared several common features (as
amended, if not originally): "rights-of-way" easements for
the construction of the railwaysj including the right to use
materials in the vicinity for construction and maintenance
of the lines; the delineation of place limits within which the
railroads' grants were contained (these ranged from ten miles
to forty miles on each side of the railway); checkerboard
provisions whereby the railroads' grants contained only
alternate sections; the exclusion of mineral lands (other than
coal and iron) and lands already settled, claimed, or reserved
pursuant to federallawsj and the provision for indemnity

7Pacific Railway Act of Tuly 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489, Statutes at Large, 37 th Cong.,
2d sess., ch. 120.
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strips outside of the place limits within which the railroads
could select lands in lieu of excluded place lands. In addition, some grants contained restrictions on the timing and
manner of the railroads' disposition of lands to which they
had received patents. 8
As part of this general land grant policy, Congress in 1866
granted several million acres to Oregon for the construction of
a railroad from Portland southward to the California border,
where such road would connect with another being built from
Sacramento. Oregon was directed to designate a company to
construct the railroad and to receive a land grant consisting
of alternating sections of public lands within ten miles of the
railway as a subsidy to offset its operating expenses. Three
years later, after the grant's specified time limit passed without
any companies taking the required steps to avail themselves
of the grant, Congress renewed the grant but added conditions
to ensure that land was sold to settlers, not speculators. Based
on the new conditions, the railroad receiving the grant was
required to dispose of the land only to "bona fide settlers," in
parcels no larger than 160 acres, and for no more than $2.50
per acre. Together, these conditions were commonly referred
to as the "homestead clause." It was under this regime that
the Oregon & California acquired the rights to more than three
million acres stretching in a checkerboard pattern from the
Coast Range to the Cascade Mountains and from Portland to
the California border.9
The Southern Pacific acquired control of the Oregon &
California and its land grant in 1887, shortly after which the
railway was completed. From that time until 1901, when
Harriman acquired control of the Southern Pacific and its
constituent railways, including the Oregon & California, the
company pursued a policy of disposing of its lands quickly
to develop the country and to build up long-term business
for the road. Beginning in 1901, Harriman introduced new
policies to oversee the railroad's use and disposal of the land
grant. Although the various land departments of the constituent railroads had previously enjoyed much autonomy within
the Southern Pacific system, Harriman sought to centralize authority and to develop a comprehensive land use plan,

8See Samuel Dana, Forest and Range Policy: Its Development in the United
States (New York, 1956),36-37, for a succinct summary of the legislative acts
that created the land grants.

90regon eiJ California Railroad Co. v. United States, 238 U.S. 393, 409 (1915).
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whereby any of his railroads' lands would be used to benefit
his entire system. 10
Harriman's strategy required an extensive review of the
Southern Pacific's policies of land disposal up to that point. Regarding the Oregon & California land grant, the records showed
that the railroad had disposed of 813,000 acres with little regard for the homestead clause. In fact, only 127,000 acres were
sold in compliance with that clause, while more than half were
sold in parcels of more than two thousand acres. The average
sale price was about five dollars an acre, double the maximum
allowedY A large portion of the 813,000 acres was sold after
1895, when lumber companies and investors became interested
in Oregon's vast timber resources primarily for speculative
purposes. From 1895 to 1901, the company disposed of 363,000
acres to only thirty-eight buyers, with prices ranging from five
dollars to forty dollars an acre. 12
Although the homestead clause had little influence on the
railroad's decisions regarding disposal of grant lands, the grant's
other measure meant to ensure rapid settlement-its checkerboarding provision-heavily constrained the railroad's activities. One of the principal purposes of checkerboarding was to
ensure that lands along the railroad were settled and deVeloped
rather than held in monopoly by the railroad or any successor
in interest. This system, though, as applied to non-agricultural
lands, had the effect of making it difficult for any entity to
use the land for any purpose. The timberlands of Oregon, for
example, were primarily, if not exclusively, valuable for their
timber, but lumber operations required a solid body of land in
order to extract timber at a profit. The Southern Pacific long
recognized this fact, as did Harriman's land commissioner,
Charles W. Eberlein, who complained that the checkerboard
pattern of the railroad's grant made it virtually impossible for
the railroad to dispose of the land, since timberlands could not
be sold in a "piece-meal" fashion.]3

JOCharles W. Eberlein, whom Harriman dispatched to San Francisco to oversee
the land departments, later reported that Harriman's control was so tight that
Eberlein was required to send all applications for purchase of timberlands to
New York for Harriman to review and decide on a course of action. Transcript
of Record, Supreme Court of the United States, no. 492, October term, 1916,
Oregon eiJ California Railway Co. v. United States (hereinafter referred to as
"Transcript"), available at The Making of Modern Law: U.S. Supreme Court
Records and Briefs 2329, 2399, 2746, http://gdc.gale.com.
llU.S. Congress, House Report, 60th Cong., 1st sess., 1908, no. 130l.
l2Ellis, "Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant," 260-61.
130rsi, Sunset Limited, 381; Transcript, 2328.
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Harriman indeed found that the railroad's long-followed,
pro-development policy of selling timberlands cheaply only
encouraged speculation. This was both because the annual rise
in value of the timber exceeded the taxes and interest payments required to retain the land, thus making it profitable
simply to hold the land, and because there was not much of a
market for the grant's timber, due to its relative inaccessibility as compared to the still-plentiful forests of Washington and
California. Accordingly, only" a very, very small fraction" of
the timberlands that the Oregon & California sold, including
those it sold either directly or indirectly to lumber companies
such as the Booth-Kelly Lumber Company, had been milled
even by 1912. Based on these experiences, Eberlein ultimately
concluded that /I anybody that comes in and wants to buy all
the timber in [multiple] townships of land [had] no immediate
intention of doing anything with it."14 Rather, the lands were
simply "held for the rise. illS
In 1903, citing the fact that the remaining lands were
primarily heavily timbered and unsuitable for settlement,
Harriman ordered the termination of all timberland sales in
lands encompassed by the Oregon & California grant. 16 At
the National Irrigation Congress of 1907, held in Sacramento,
California, Harriman justified his decision to withhold the
lands from sale based on the need for conservation. He insisted
that his companies were not "holding those lands for speculation" but instead were holding them lito protect [the people]
in the future." Considering that "ties are the foundation of the
transportation line," he stated his intent "to have a reserve
with which we can maintain these great transportation lines
for those that come after, that they may not accuse us of wast-

14Transcript, 2342--44.
15Ibid. As another example of this phenomenon, Eberlein discussed the example
of TB. Walker's handling of his timberlands in northeastern California: "They
bought out timber concerns and mills and shut them down and they have existed all this time simply upon the increase in the growth of the timber which,
as I have told you, is large enough in timber of certain age to more than equal
the taxes and interest on the investmenti and in this particular case it must be
remembered that this timber was sold by the Railroad on conditions that never
were duplicated that I know of in this country." Transcript, 2351-52.
16This policy was not limited to the Oregon & California land grant but rather
applied to all lands of the Southern Pacific and Central Pacific as well. See
Orsi, Sunset Limited, 123-25.
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ing the resources which we had at our command. 1117 Harriman's
1907 speech was consistent with a statement he made to a
newspaper reporter that same year:
The Southern Pacific will sell land to settlers, but not
to speculators. We can tell a speculator from a settler as
well as anyone. The agricultural land we will sell, but the
timber-land we will retain, because we must have ties and
bridge timbers, and we must retain our timber for future
supply. The Southern Pacific has an insufficient amount
of timber now, and we have had to buy large tracts,
looking to the future supply of ties and material. Yes, we
will sell to settlers, but speculators will get none. IS
Harriman's goal, in other words, was to prevent harmful speculation and to conserve the timber for future railroad use.
At first glance, Harriman's conservationist justification
seems inconsistent with the dominant brand of conservation
represented by President Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford
Pinchot, neither of whom ever advocated massive curtailing
of development. Rather they advocated managing forests with
the goal of promoting more efficient and prolonged development without sacrificing present yield. At the meeting of the
American Forestry Congress in 1905, immediately after which
management of forests was transferred to the Department of
Agriculture under the newly renamed Forest Service, Roosevelt
assured pro-development westerners that the government's
policy was consistent to give to every portion of the public
domain its highest possible amount of use." 19 Pinchot added
that If[tJhe administration of the forest reserves is based upon
the general principle ... that the reserves are for use. They
/I

17The Official Proceedings of the 15th National Irrigation Congress, September 2-7, 1907, Sacramento, California; also quoted in House Committee on
the Public Lands, Oregon and California Land Grants, 64th Cong., 1" sess.,
1916 (hereinafter referred to as the 0 eJ C Land Grants), 143-44. See W.G.
Robbins, "Lumber Production and Community Stability: A View from the
Pacific Northwest," Journal of Forest History 31:4 (October 1987): 187-96;
Wesley C. Ballaine, "The Revested Oregon and California Railroad Grant
Lands: A Problem in Land Management," Land Economics 29:3 (August 1953):
219-32; John Messing, "Public Lands, Politics, and Progressives: The Oregon
Land Fraud Trials, 1903-1910," Pacific Historical Review 35:1 (February
1966): 35-66.
18Transcript, 4267. According to Orsi, this statement may have been a lie, based
on the fact that the initial sale order applied to all lands, and very few sales occurred on any lands during Harriman's tenure. See Orsi, Sunset Limited, 124-25.
19American Forestry Association, Proceedings of the American Forest Congress, January 2-6,1905, Washington, D.C. (Washington, DC, 1905), 11.
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must be useful first of all to the people of the neighborhood in
which they lie. Ii 20 On their face, Harriman's policies appeared
to violate this simple rule of conservation.
Assuming that Harriman's no-sale rule thwarted development, it would indeed seem that his policies contradicted the
very conservationist principles he attempted to evoke. However,
it is not at all clear that his policy impacted development at all.
As of the time when Harriman issued his no-sale order, there
were not many settlers on the land, even after decades of efforts
to attract farmers from the East. Moreover, as the railroad's land
commissioner Eberlein reported, almost all of the lands in the
possession of lumber companies were simply being held, likely
because of their inaccessibility and distance from markets. That
the lack of development was due more to physical and economic
geography than to Harriman's decisions would later be confirmed by both government reports and the government's own
experiences once it reacquired the lands in 1916. 21
Given these realities, which Harriman and his men appreciated long before Congress did, Harriman's termination of land
sales can be seen not as anti-development but as a recognition that the market system, in this instance, had failed-and
would likely continue to fail-to promote the rational, efficient
use the land's natural resources. This rationale was thus
consistent with the conservation movement, which was, above
all-as Samuel P. Hays has articulated-a scientific movement
advocating that scientists take the lead in determining natural
resource use rather than leaving such questions to political or
economic forces. n Harriman was both a benefactor and a consumer of the emerging sciences of conservation.
Harriman had already demonstrated his personal support of
the natural sciences when he arranged and funded a maritime
expedition to Alaska in 1899. What began as a vacation for him
and his family was radically transformed when Harriman conceived of inviting an entire community of scientists to explore
and document the coastlines of Alaska. The expedition included
biologists, botanists, geographers, geologists, and zoologists, as
well as several artists and intellectual writers. Scientists and
intellectuals who accepted Harriman's invitation to participate included John A. Muir; C. Hart Merriam, chief of the U.S.

2°American Forestry Association, Proceedings of the American Forest Congress, 392.
21See Wesley C. Ballaine, "The Revested Oregon and California Railroad Grant
Lands: A Problem in Land Management," Land Economics 29 (August 1953): 224.
22Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive
Conservation Movement, 1890-1920 (Pittsburgh, PA, 1999),3.
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Biological Survey; William E. Ritter, president of the California
Academy of Sciences; Henry Gannett, chief of the u.S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey; George B. Grinnell, editor of Forest and
Stream; and Bernhard E. Fernow, former chief of the Department
of Agriculture's Division of Forestry.23 In the decade following
their time together on what was referred to as the "Harriman
Expedition," Muir and Harriman maintained a regular correspondence a:o.d formed what environmental historian Donald
Worster has labeled" an improbable bond" based on a "mutual
understanding ... [ofJ the value of an efficient railroad system
and on the wisdom of establishing national parks. t124 Worster recently argued that, from the expedition until Harriman's death a
decade later, Muir saw Harriman" as a well-meaning friend and
potential ally of the conservation movement. 1125
Harriman was also a consumer of conservation science. In 1902,
he personally applied to the Bureau of Forestry for experts to be dispatched to Arden House, his IS,OOD-acre estate in Orange County,
New York, to advise him on how to conserve the estate's 8,000
acres of dense forest. 26 On receiving Harriman's request, the bureau
sent nine men instead of the normal two to develop a working
plan for iIllproving Harriman's timber. The foresters reported being
excited at the opportunity to use "ingenious methods" for examining the abilities of various species of trees to bear shade, to reproduce, and to withstand damage from forest firesP The nine forestry
students completed the necessary fieldwork between April 1 and
June IS, during which time they created a forest map of the entire
tract and compiled, according to the Department of Agriculture's
annual report, 1/ a careful study of the forest, by which its character,
condition, present stand, and future yield were ascertained. 1128
There is also evidence that Harriman was motivated not just
by a form of utilitarian conservation but also by a preservationist ethos. After visiting Harriman's New York estate, Muir, for
one, concluded that Harriman indeed loved the forest and its
23See "The Harriman Expedition," Los Angeles Times, August 1,1899.
24Donald Worster, A Passion for Nature: The Life of Tohn Muir (New York,
2008),408.
25Jbid., 362-63.
26In 1898, as head of the Division of Forestry, Pinchot had issued "Circular 21."
This document offered to assist private landowners to develop plans for forest
management and fire protection, provided that the owners paid all expenses.
Thomas R. Cox et al., This Well· Wooded Land: Americans and Their Forests
from Colonial Times to the Present (Lincoln, NE, 1985).
27"To Improve the Harriman Forest," New York Times, April 20, 1902.
2BU.S. Department of Agriculture, Annual Reports of the Department of
Agriculture for the Fiscal Year Ended Tune 30,1902. Report of the Secretary of
Agriculture, Departmental Reports (Washington, DC, 1902).
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Memhersof the Harriman Expedition and some acquaintances
gather at Dutch Harhor, Alaskaf July 1899. (Courtesy of University
of Washington Librariesf Special Collections. Negative number
Harriman 187)

wildlife and considered it something to cherish and conserve,
at least when consistent with economic development. Beyond
preserving his own timbered estate, Harriman's desire to leave
certain places alone was also demonstrated in 1905 when he
lobbied in support of the Sierra Clubfs efforts to incorporate the
Yosemite Valley into the national park that then surrounded it.
Later, in his 1907 speech before the National Irrigation Congress, he showed an aesthetic concern for the preservation of
Oregonfs natural beauty, He argued that flOregon ought to be the
country's playground. There's a vastness of fine scenery there.Jl29
Through his words and actions, Harriman was able to convince
Muir of his concern for nature beyond its mere economic value.
In spring 1909, when Muir was visiting Harriman and his family
in Pasadena, California, Muir was asked how he, a nature lover,
[could] happen to be visiting a cold-blooded financier." He answered, reportedly while fighting back tears, that "Mr. Harriman
has a heart, People may not know it, but he loves the flowers
and the trees, He loves nature and human nature. '130
II

29"Magnate Wins Applause for Fanny Speech," San Francisco Call, September 5, 1907.
30"Sidetracks All Callers," Los Angeles Times, March 17, 1909.
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Importantly, the people of Oregon also took Harriman at his
word. While historians have questioned Harriman's motives
in ordering the termination of land sales, Oregonians believed
his stated rationale, and this is precisely why they became so
angered. Harriman's no-sale order and his subsequent explanation enraged a wide cross-section of the public, particularly
in the affected localities of Oregon. Encouraged by prominent
lumber companies in the state, local residents accused Harriman
of undermining Oregon's development by locking up its natural
resources. While the backlash against Harriman undoubtedly fed
off a populist distrust of railroads as malevolent monopolies that
threatened to hold local populations hostage to their economic
whims, people also linked Harriman to what they saw as an
equally menacing force: the eastern conservation movement. In
the weeks following his 1907 speech at Sacramento, the Oregonian accused Harriman of desiring "to make areserve out of
the whole of Oregon./I In fact, said the paper, "he counts it his
reserve now." 31
31Excerpted in "Mr. Harriman's Apology Not Accepted," San Francisco Call,
September 17, 1907.

Architect William H. Holabird, E.H. Harriman, and John Muir (left to right)
posed together at Harriman's lodge in Pelican Bay, Oregon. {Courtesy of
John Muir Papers, Holt-Atherton Special Collections, University of the
Pacific Library, MSS04.F25-1386.Copyright 1984 Muir-Hanna Trust)
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The Oregonian questioned not just Harriman's motivations,
but those of all who purported to be concerned with conservation: "[TJhis state is plastered from one end to the other with
timber speculators in syndicates and as individuals. All pretend
to be saving for the nation a wood supply. The truth is they are
keeping out settlement and maintaining a wilderness in order at
some future day to gratify
lust for wealth. 1132 The Oregonian
believed that the state needed, above all, "the clearing up of forest
land" near the railroads so that it could "be used for agriculture
and for sustaining a larger population." 33 To the people along
the Oregon & California line, whether Harriman epitomized the
speculator or the conservationist was immaterial, since the conservationist was merely a new form of speculator. Both were seen
as equally threatening to the rapid development of the region.
Based on Harriman's apparent refusal to sell much, if not all,
of the remaining land grant, Senator Benjamin R. Tillman of
South Carolina introduced, and Congress quickly passed, legislation authorizing the attorney general to institute proceedings for
the forfeiture of the railroad's unsold lands. Attorney General
George W. Wickersham complied and filed suit in September
1908 against the railroad, one of its creditors, and many individuals and companies who had purchased lands in violation of
the grant's terms. 34 Although the no-sale order precipitated the
lawsuit, the many sales the railroad made prior to 1903 in violation of the homestead clause served as its legal justification.
3211Mr. Harriman's Apology Not Accepted."
33Ibid. Historian Roy M. Robbins argues that the West during this time was not
anti-conservationist at all but instead was opposed to government intervention
based on the government's past promotion of land theft, including most notably
the Forest Lieu Land Act of 1897. Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage:
The Public Domain, 1776-1936 (Lincoln, NE, 1962), 338-40. Carlos Arnaldo
Schwantes, however, insists that western resistance was based on a rational fear
that the conservation ethos, despite Roosevelt's assertions to the contrary, would
only serve to tie up resources and inhibit growth. Schwantes, The Pacific Northwest: An Interpretive History, rev. and enl. ed. (Lincoln, NE, 1996), 22l.
34In 1912, Congress passed the Forgiveness Act, 37 Stat. 320, which dropped
the government's claims against individuals and companies that had purchased
large tracts of land in good faith and without knowledge of the grant's homestead clause forbidding such sales. This legislation was passed in no small part
because the lawyers at the Department of Justice had convinced members of
Congress that the individuals who purchased the affected 524,000 acres were
"small fry" settlers and were so numerous that litigation would be virtually
unending, meaning also that the land would be tied up for decades. It was later
revealed that several of the purchasers were lumber companies and other interests that had purchased tracts in excess of 10,000 acres, and many of these "innocent purchasers" had been indicted-and some convicted-in the land fraud
trials of 1905-1907. See 0 eV C Land Grants, 203. The Forgiveness Act allowed
innocent purchasers to keep title so long as they paid the government $2.50 per
acre, even though some of the land was worth as much as $500 per acre.
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Seeming to contradict the Harriman regime's assessment of
the grant lands was the fact that, beginning in 1907 and continuing for the entire seven years of litigation, thousands of
individuals filed applications with the railroad company for the
purchase of quarter sections. In that year, as the political movement to force the forfeiture of the land grant gained momentum, residents of Oregon began "rushing into the rich timber
country and gobbling it up." 35 This movement apparently was
based on the government's indications that, once individuals
offered to purchase lands at $2.50 an acre and were refused,
they would then have standing to sue the railroad to force such
sales and would "have a pretty good case."36 The Wall Street
Journal reported" a frenzy of excitement" in Oregon, where
"thousands are leaving home and stampeding to the railroad
land grants ... to force Harriman to surrender" the landY By
June 1907, it was reported that "in many counties every quarter section of the land held by the railroad has a claimant. "38
Although the government later used these claims as evidence that the land was indeed capable of being settled under
the hom~stead clause-contrary to the claims of Harriman and
his railroad-it appears that the vast majority of the applicants
in fact had no intention of homesteading on their claims .. In his
extensive overview of the Oregon & California land grant,
David Maldwyn Ellis concluded that "these so-called settlers
were speculators or dummies for speculators who hoped to
make good their title to valuable timberlands at a nominal
sum."39 Indeed, "practically all" of the 14,000 to 15,000 applications to buy land from the railroad company during this
time period, according to Ellis, "were speculative in character,"
a fact that was revealed over the next decade as the Department
of Justice convicted nine professional locators, each representing
several hundred applicants, for fraud in connection with these
purported applications for purchase and actual settlement.40

3511Ignorant Oregon Farmers," Washington Post, June 4, 1907.
36Ibid. As it turned out, they did not have a good case; the Supreme Court
ultimately dismissed the claims of these prospective purchasers. Based on the
fact that the grant did not compel the railroad to sell and did not even define
II actual settler," the prospective purchasers did not have any right to enforce
the grant's conditions, according to the Court. Oregon eiJ California Railroad
Co., 238 U.S. at 434-35.
3711 After Harriman Road's Land," Wall Street Journai, June 5,1907.
38Jbid.
39Ellis, "0regon and California Railroad Land Grant," 264.
40See Ellis, "Oregon and California Railroad Land Grant," 268.
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Testimony in
divestiture trial corroborated Harriman's
assessment that the vast majority of the land was unsuitable
for the type of homesteading that Congress had envisioned
and the grant required. In fact, in all of his work in the railroad's land department since he was first employed in 1889,
EA. Elliott could not remember a single instance in which
the railroad had sold a quarter section to a person who then
actually made a home and a living on that acreage. 41 The same
apparently was true on the even sections within the grant;
Homer D. Angell, a surveyor for the railroad and the government, observed that "lands acquired by homestead from the
government on
timbered areas are never occupied for any
appreciable period after
has been acquired." 42 In many
cases, those who attempted to establish homesteads on these
lands failed. Elliott noted that the few improvements that had
existed on these lands in the 1880s had, by the first decade of
the twentieth century, "grown up to brush. "43
Regardless of the wisdom of congressional policy, the federal government at first appeared to have the law on its side.
In 1913 the district court ruled in the government's favor by
decreeing the unsold grant lands forfeited and quieting the
government's title to such lands. The railroad, however, appealed this decision on several legal grounds, including that
the homestead clause constituted not a condition subsequent
justifying forfeiture, but rather a set of restrictive and unenforceable covenants, and alternatively that the government had
waived its right to enforcement of the provision through its
years of acquiescence. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court, Justice Joseph McKenna agreed with the railroad that
the homestead clause lacked the required technical language
to constitute a condition subsequent touching the railroad's
property interest, but he also disagreed with the railroad's
contentions that the conditions were unenforceable. He held
instead that the grant's conditions constituted both contractual
covenants and laws, and thus were strictly enforceable.
As to the appropriate remedy, however, the Court agreed
with the railroad's contention that the land invited "more to
speculation than to settlement. "44 It therefore declined to order
the railroad to sell the remaining lands pursuant to the terms
of the grant or merely to enjoin the railroad from violating the
grant any further. Instead, apparently in recognition that the
41Transcript, 2727.
42Transcript, 2774.
43Transcript, 2727.

440regon eJ California RailroadCo., 238 U.S. at 438.
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homestead clause was unworkable as applied to the remaining
grant lands, it enjoined the railroad from any disposition of
them whatever or of the timber thereon, and from cutting or
authorizing the cutting or removal of any of the timber thereon, II and it directed Congress to provide by legislation for their
disposition in accordance with such policy as it may deem
"fitting under the circumstances. "45 In disposing of the lands,
Congress was required to secure to the railroad all the value
the granting acts conferred upon the railroads. 1146
In deciding how to dispose of the lands, some in Congress
insisted that the lands were still amenable to the type of settlement that Congress originally had contemplated, despite all
the evidence to the contrary. Representative Willis C. Hawley
from Oregon, for example, claimed to have received a large
number of letters from men ... stating that there have been
people living on these lands, with good houses and good improvements, who settled on the lands and made their improvements in good faith and are living there and have been making
a home for a number of years on the land."47 "All through the
grant," he insisted, "with the exception of comparatively small
areas, there are farms of agricultural lands. 1148 Representative
Clifton N. McArthur; also from Oregon; however, disputed
Hawley's claims. He cited a joint investigation conducted by
the Interior, Justice, and Post Office departments, which found
that all but a comparatively small percentage/f of the thousands of applications for the purchase of land from the railroad
were IIsecured by so-called locators," and that there were "very
few, if any, actual settlers on these lands" as of 1916. 49
The interests of Oregonians weighed heavily on Congress'
deliberations. Immediately after the Supreme Court delivered
its opinion, the governor of Oregon called together delegates in
Salem to discuss the matter. The conference attendees resolved
that Congress should II enact laws defining
settling who
shall be considered actual settlers ... and what shall be considered an actual settlement, and requiring the [railroad] to
perform the terms and conditions of the [grant] and to sell and
dispose of said lands according to the true intent and purpose of
/I

/I

1/

1/

45Ibid.

460regon ei! California Railroad Co., 238 U.S. at 439.
47

0 ei! C Land Grants, 187.

48Ibid./ 188. Clay Tallman, commissioner of the General Land Office, corroborated Hawley's testimony by estimating that as much as 75 percent of the land
was suitable for settlement and cultivation.
49

0 ei! C Land Grants, 203, 251.
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[the grantj."so They also declared their "unalterable" opposition
to the creation or enlargement of any forest reserves in Oregon.
They proposed, instead, that Congress provide for the immediate sale of grant lands under the conditions of the homestead
clause, while also protecting the process from fraud. 51 Despite
the appearance of unanimity, however, McArthur contended
that Oregonians were in fact divided on how the lands should
be handled. He cited the fact that, immediately after the
conference passed its initial resolutions, it passed a new set
of resolutions directing the conference chairman to form a
committee to negotiate a settlement with the Southern Pacific
that could then be presented to Congress, the apparent purpose
being, above all, to avoid a prolonged dispute. 52
The politicians from Oregon largely followed suit in arguing that Congress should provide for actual settlement of the
lands. For his part, Senator George Chamberlain, whose bill
dominated the debate in Congress and ultimately was passed,
reported that he realized, after Harriman's speech at the Irrigation Congress in 1907, "the importance to the people of the
State to have these lands brought under actual settlement by
sale or otherwise so as to assist the State in its development
and in the purposes of government." S3 Although he claimed to
be "nearly alone in the West ... in defending the policies of the
Forestry Service" and to have been /I one of the original advocates of that for the welfare of the people, with Mr. Pinchot,"
he argued that no more lands in Oregon, except those that were
deemed necessary to protect water supplies, should be added to
the forest reserves. 54 Representative Hawley purported to relay
his constituents' demands "that no part of the lands be placed
in the forest reserves; that all of these lands be made available
for development under proper conditions; that all lands capable
of any agricultural use be disposed of for that purpose; that the
just rights of the State and counties of Oregon be recognized
and provided for; that provision be made for the payment of
accrued taxes; and that all of these lands remain on the tax
rolls. 1155 Finally, Representative McArthur insisted that what
Oregonians wanted most were actual settlers, people who will
go there and make homes in the wilderness ... and build up
If

SOIbid., 7.
5lIbid.
52Ibid., 200.
53Ibid., 144.
54Ibid.} 156.
55Ibid., 200.
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communities that will be of material benefit to the development of the state. 1156
A report submitted by the Department of Agriculture, as well
as the testimony of department officials, not only confirmed
the railroad's assessment of the unsuitability of the grant lands
for settlement, but also implicitly vindicated both the railroad's
policy of selling timberlands in large tracts prior to 1903 and its
termination of land sales after that date. The department considered II some" of the lands to be agricultural, but it determined
that "most of it was heavily timbered." s7 Furthermore, just as
the railroad had found it untenable to sell heavily timbered
lands in 160-acre legal subdivisions, the department's report
criticized any attempt to limit land sales to small legal subdivisions as "not consistent with the natural requirements of the
industry. 1158 Assistant Forester William B. Greeley testified that
limiting sales by 1/ any legal subdivision" would "likely lead to
mismanagement/' and he encouraged Congress to leave it to
the Interior or Agriculture department to make sales "in accordance with the topography-normally by watershed-and the
natural logging factors. "59 He indicated that even sales in excess
of 20,000 acres could be justified. FinallYI the Department of
Agriculture confirmed Harriman's contention that there was
little market for the immediate consumption of timber and that
any purchases of timberlands would be at very low prices and
only for speculative purposes. Based on western Oregon's market
position, the department reported that "it [was] obvious that
vast quantities of privately owned timber must be held for many
decades before it can be marketed" for consumption. Thus the
department recommended holding the lands from sale, except in
the few cases where local mills demanded stumpage, until such
time-possibly even decades into the future-that the market
conditions changed considerably.60
56Ibid., 20l.
5lIbid., 219. Regarding those timberlands deemed agricultural, Assistant
Forester William B. Greeley testified that the costs of clearing timber for the
purposes of cultivation-which could be as much as $400 per acre-would be
"relatively heavy," the clear insinuation being that such costs would act as an
economic barrier to such development. 0 eiJ C Land Grants, 240.
Ibid., 224.
59Ibid., 242.
58

6°Ibid., 220-22. Of course, representatives from the U.s. Forest Service differed
from the railroad's policy in one important respect: it pushed for all of the
timberlands to be held in public ownership under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service. Even this, however, was not based on a distrust of the railroad's
motives, but rather on a concern that carrying the lands would be too heavy a
burden for any private party. See 0 eiJ C Land Grants, 236-37.
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Unfortunately, Congress disregarded many of the observations and recommendations of the Department of Agriculture
in its Chamberlain-Ferris Act of 1916. This act revested the
remaining grant lands in the federal government and provided
for their sale as well as the disposal of the timber upon them.
Rather than providing for the efficient management of the
forests pursuant to conservationist principles, as government
foresters had advised, the act directed the secretary of the interior to sell off the timber to the highest bidder, at which time
the timberlands could be reclassified as agricultural land and
opened for settlement. Moreover, Congress disregarded Secretary David F. Houston's recommendations that any sales of
timberlands be in large tracts and not according to legal subdivision when it instead provided that each legal subdivision be
offered for sale separately before any larger sales were made.
Finally, in designating that proceeds from land and timber sales
in excess of the amount owed to the railroad would adequately
compensate the Oregon counties for tax revenues lost as a result of the land's being ordered forfeited in 1913 and ultimately
transferred to public ownership in 1916, Congress failed to
heed the department's advice regarding the lack of an immediate market for standing timber and the extent to which the immediate sale of timber would depress its price.61 Sure enough,
sales were slow, the system Congress created proved unworkable, and the counties were on the verge of economic collapse
in 1926, when Congress approved a loan to the counties in the
amount of lost tax revenues and passed a new formula for distributing the revenues from the lands.
With its 1916 legislation, Congress exchanged a land regime
in which the railroad had demonstrated its interest in managing the lands for long-term sustainability for one that perpetuated the federal government's nineteenth-century approach
to public lands. All of this occurred despite the concerns
expressed by the prior generation over the exhaustibility of the
61Chamberlain-Ferris Act of June 9, 1916, U.S. Statutes at Large, 64th Cong.,
Is' sess., ch. 137,39 Stat. 218. After the district court's decree of forfeiture on
July I, 1913, the railroad stopped paying taxes on unsold lands. Prior to the
forfeiture, the railroad had paid a total of $1,820,000 in taxes on the land, much
of which was in recent years due to the increased assessed value of the lands.
In his testimony before the congressional committee considering the Oregon
&. California land grant, government attorney Stephen W. Williams estimated
that the tax burden had increased tenfold in the previous ten years and that the
railroad owed about $1.3 million in unpaid taxes for the previous three years.
o ei! C Land Grants, 6. The Department of Justice'S report recommended that
the government pay the back taxes immediately, not only in fairness to the
adversely impacted counties, but also to remove the "cloud upon the Government's title," which would "embarrass any attempt to dispose of the lands to
settlers." 0 ei! C Land Grants, 26.
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nation's natural resources and over the waste and possible irreversible damage that resulted (and would continue to result)
from the government's promotion of immediate development.
The actions of Harriman and his Oregon & California railroad were consistent with conservationist principlesj Harriman
and other railroad officials repeatedly expressed a concern for
guaranteeing a sustainable supply of timber both to guarantee a permanent supply for the railroad's operations and to
facilitate the continued prosperity of the region on which the
railroad depended. The myth regarding conservation portrays
the battle over control of the natural environment as one pitting "the people," as represented by conservationists, against
"the interests" represented by industrialists and capitalists.
According to this myth, Harriman cannot be considered a
conservationist because he was a capitalist who was motivated
by self-interest, namely the continued economic viability of his
railroad empire, in addition to any concerns he may have held
for the general public welfare. This case, however, serves as a
prime illustration of Samuel P. Hays' influential thesis that the
Progressive conservation movement was not, in fact, a crusade
of the people against the trusts, as many Progressives tried to
argue. 62 Those economic, political, and legal actors supposedly
least responsive to the needs or demands of "the people"-a
railroad tycoon and appointed federal bureaucrats-were the
first to realize that the lands of the Oregon & California grant
should be managed as forests with an appreciation of the needs
of future generations, while the people and their representatives in Congress continued to push for the clearing of timberlands and the perpetuation of the homestead policy of the
nineteenth century.
President Calvin Coolidge would later complain about the
land-grant railroads' ability to use the law as an instrument not
only to insulate themselves from prosecution for their supposed
subversions of federal land-grant policies, but also to secure
additional benefits contrary to the interests of the public and
the government in efficiently managing the nation's natural
62Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency. See also James L. Penick,
Progressive Politics and Conservation: Ballinger-Pinchot Affair (Chicago, 1968)
(detailing Ballinger's criticisms of Pinchot's policies as favoring the eastern
corporate interests at the expense of western individuals); Louis S. Warren, The
Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America
(New Haven, CT, 1997) (exploring the tensions between local autonomy and
national control in regard to wildlife and the impact of conservation on local
interests); Karl Jacoby, Crimes against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves,
and the Hidden History of American Conservation (Berkeley, CA, 2001)
(depicting the national conservation movement as a tool of colonization and
state-building).
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resources. 63 However, the experiences of the Oregon & California
during the first decades of the twentieth century provide a far
different narrative. While certainly corroborating Coolidge's lament that law had operated to inhibit effective management of
natural resources, the Oregon & California's experiences show,
at least in this important instance, that it was the government,
and not the raihoad, that used outdated laws as instruments to
block conservationist advances, and it was the raihoad, and not
the democratically elected branches of government, that sought
cooperation with the federal bureaucracy to implement management regimes that would ensure sustainable economic development, even if at the cost of short-term gains.
That Harriman had a profit motive in seeking to ensure a
continuous supply of timber for the maintenance of his raihoad
empire should not undermine his conservationist credentials.
Indeed, notable conservationists within the federal forest
bureaucracy recognized that the movement depended on the
willing participation of business interests. Writing just a year
before Harriman's termination of land sales, for example,
former chief of the Division of Forestry Bernhard E. Fernow
predicted that wealthy capitalists like Harriman, "who can
see the financial advantages of the future in forest properties,"
would quickly become the newest" class" of conservationists.
Fernow thus concluded that, aside from being owned by the
government, forest resources were most likely to be conserved
when in "the hands of perpetual corporations and wealthy
owners."64 Other conservationists, including Pinchot, recognized that their movement would succeed only when private
commercial entities appreciated the extent to which their
continued prosperity depended on the rational management
of natural resources. 65 As Roosevelt asserted at the American
Forest Congress in 1905, the conservation movement-as well
as America's continued economic growth-would depend not
on philanthropists or the general public, but on "the men who
are actively interested in the use of the forest in one way or
another."66 Harriman agreed with Roosevelt's assessment that
"the raihoads must have ties," and thus he was among the first
to answer the conservationists' call.

63u.s. House Report 512, Northern Pacific Land Grants, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 1-2.
64Bernhard E. Fernow, Economics of Forestry: A Reference Book for Students of
Political Economy and Professional and Lay Students of Forestry (New Yor~
1902), 345-46.
65 American Forestry Association, Proceedings of the American Forest Congress, 390-93.
66Jbid., 6-8.

